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Introduction
The first cases of COVID-19 in care homes in England were 
reported in the second week of March 2020. By the end of 
July there had been nearly 7,000 care home outbreaks in 
England, with more than three quarters occurring before 
the end of April (Public Health England, 2020e). Between 
the 2nd of March and the 20th of June, English care homes 
registered 66,112 deaths (Office for National Statistics, 
2020), of which 29% were registered as COVID-19 deaths. 
Between weeks 11 and 26 (ending 26th of June), mortality 
in care homes compared to previous years had increased by 
79% in England, 62% in Scotland and 66% in Wales (Bell, 
Comas-Herrera, Henderson, et al., 2020). The proportion of 
care home residents who died was also second highest in the 
UK compared to other countries in Europe (Comas-Herrera, 
Zalakaín, et al., 2020) and the reasons for this are disputed. 
The UK’s Health and Social Care Secretary, responsible pri-
marily for the situation in England as both health and social 
care are the responsibility of the devolved administrations 
in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, claimed that the 
government had “tried to throw a protective ring” around 
care homes (The Financial Times, 2020) but the Prime Min-
ister argued that “too many care homes didn’t really follow 
the procedures” (Walker, Proctor and Syal, 2020). Here, we 
examine the policies set out by the government and con-
trast them with the experiences reported by care home pro-
viders during end of May and early June 2020.
Methods
We conducted a mixed methods study, starting by identi-
fying the range of measures recommended and adopted 
internationally to address COVID-19 in care homes in 
England (Comas-Herrera, Ashcroft, et al., 2020; World 
Health Organization, 2020; World Health Organization 
Regional Office for Europe, 2020). These include the 
provision of additional funds; testing and contact tracing in 
care homes; ensuring access to personal protective equip-
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Context: COVID-19 has disproportionately impacted mortality in English care homes.
Objectives: To examine COVID-19 policies for care homes in England and to describe providers’ experi-
ences of those policies in May and June 2020.
Methods: Mixed methods including policy analysis and an anonymous online survey of English care home 
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Organization, they were arguably delayed and were not implemented effectively. Testing had taken place 
in 70% of care homes surveyed but only 36% of residents had been tested, of whom 16% were positive. 
Managers were unable to effectively implement isolation policies and reported that workforce and fund-
ing support did not always reach them. Guidance changed frequently and was conflicting and could not 
always be implemented, for example when personal protection equipment was extremely expensive and 
difficult to source.
Limitations: Although this was not a representative sample, care homes responded from across the 
country and we report the most consistent themes. Potentially, care homes that found it harder to 
implement national guidance may have been more inclined to respond to our survey than those who more 
easily changed practice, although those with outbreaks may also have had less capacity to respond. Some 
aspects of policy will have also changed since early June.
Implications: Despite policies that were put in place, care homes amongst our survey respondents were 
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ment (PPE) and other equipment; limiting visitors and new 
admissions; isolating all new admissions (inside or outside 
the care home); preparing additional isolation facilities for 
suspected or confirmed cases; recruiting additional staff 
(including healthcare staff) where there were high levels 
of staff absence or of unwell residents; avoidance of staff 
working across multiple facilities; development of guid-
ance and training in infection prevention and control.
We then reviewed policy documents and grey litera-
ture to identify the measures and policies announced for 
care homes in England by early June and mapped those 
against data on the number of outbreaks and deaths in 
care homes.
We worked with care providers and representatives 
from the National Care Forum to co-design a survey based 
on a number of themes they identified as priorities. These 
included funding, testing, PPE and infection control, isola-
tion and visitation, and staffing. The survey methods are 
described in detail elsewhere (Rajan and Mckee, 2020), 
but briefly, between the 15th of May and the 12th of June 
2020, we invited directors and managers of care homes 
that participated in webinars and WhatsApp groups to 
take part in an anonymous survey. All were members of 
the Spectrum Consortium or the Care Leaders Network 
respectively. The survey sought their experiences in 
obtaining support from health and social care bodies dur-
ing the pandemic, focussing on the key issues that the 
care home representatives had identified. These networks 
include several hundred care home providers in England 
in total. The aim was not to establish a representative sam-
ple but to identify overall themes from their experiences.
Finally, we analysed the experiences of the directors and 
managers of care homes against the announced policies 
for each of the themes.
Results
Figure 1 shows a timeline of national care home poli-
cies in England alongside the numbers of outbreaks 
and deaths using data from Public Health England (Pub-
lic Health England, 2020e) and the Office for National 
Statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2020).
We received responses from 35 care home directors 
and 43 care home managers representing a total bed 
capacity of 1,330 beds, of which 1,311 were occupied 
between December 2019 and March 2020. Care homes 
responded from across England, coming from 27 dif-
ferent Local Authorities (of 152 with responsibility for 
adult social care). The characteristics of these homes are 
reported in Table 1 and described in more detail else-
where (Rajan and Mckee, 2020). The median capacity was 
27 residents (IQR 17–37) and 58% of participating care 
homes were part of a group, of which 56% included 5 or 
fewer care homes. 37% were nursing homes, 88% cared 
for adults over the age of 65 and 65% for those with 
dementia. 93% were reliant on local authority funding 
and 86% also had self-funded clients (i.e. those who pay 
for their own care because they are not eligible for state-
funded care).
Figure 1: Timeline of English policies in relation to weekly COVID-19 outbreaks and cumulative COVID-19 deaths in 
care homes.
Numbers of outbreaks in English care homes reflect es
mates reported by Public Health England (Public Health England, 2020e) 
and cumula
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We have structured our results around the five sur-
vey themes identified by care home representatives 
(funding policies, testing, personal protection equip-
ment and infection control, isolation and visitation, and 
staffing). For each, we set out the policy context, indicat-
ing the intended measures, and then report the results of 
our survey.
Funding policies
On the 13th of March the government announced extra 
resources to tackle COVID-19, with £3.2 billion addi-
tional funding to support local authorities (who commis-
sion adult social care services for those eligible for state 
funded care), including for emergency provision of PPE 
(Public Health England, 2020c). Nearly two months later, 
the government announced that PPE would be zero-rated 
for Value Added Tax (VAT), initially until July but subse-
quently extended to October 2020. On the 14th of May 
(Whately, 2020) the government announced an addi-
tional £600 million for a new Infection Control Fund, 
allocated to Local Authorities to pay the care sector for 
efforts to minimise staff transmission, although this did 
not include PPE (Department of Health and Social Care, 
2020a).
Funding survey results
PPE had a major impact on costs of care, with 91% of direc-
tors in our survey reporting that costs of disposable and 
reusable supplies had increased, while 63% also described 
increased staffing and agency costs, with some stating 
that staffing agencies had inflated their costs. One direc-
tor said “The cost of PPE has increased astronomically. 
For example, 800 aprons from our supplier used to cost 
approximately £9. One thousand of the same aprons now 
cost £43. These costs are simply not sustainable. Our usual 
provider is now unable to source some PPE and we are 
now forced to spend even more than the already inflated 
prices.” Despite the marked inflation in PPE costs, only 
30% of care home managers in our survey had received 
a financial uplift at the time of the survey with 73% stat-
ing that they needed more funding. 69% of directors we 
surveyed also described a fall in occupancy since February, 
with multiple COVID-19 deaths and reduced admissions 
resulting in empty unfunded beds. Of those surveyed, 80% 
of care home managers had not received additional fund-
ing to cover this fall in occupancy, and a third of directors 
commented on inconsistencies between different Local 
Authorities, with many refraining from paying. According 
to one director, “many operators struggle financially and 
may go bust.”
Testing Policies
Initially national policies on testing care home residents 
were lacking and only those who had travelled abroad 
were considered to be at sufficiently high risk to require 
testing. Testing was first mentioned in social care guid-
ance on the 13th of March (Public Health England, 2020c), 
but was limited to a maximum of 5 symptomatic residents 
in each home (Dunn et al., 2020). Initially testing was 
organised by Public Health England’s health protection 
teams, triggered by notification of 2 or more suspected 
cases, although this was not contained in contemporary 
guidance (Public Health England, 2020c). By the 8th of 
April, all additional symptomatic staff and residents were 
Table 1: Baseline Characteristics of Participating Care homes 




Not part of a group 18 (42%)
1–5 homes 14 (33%) 
6–10 homes 7 (16%)
11–50 homes 4 (9%)
CQC Registration Type*
With nursing 16 (37%)
Without nursing 27 (63%)
Type of Services
Adults under 65 15 (35%)
Adults over 65 38 (88%)
Physical disability 27 (63%)
Learning disabilities 11 (26%)
Mental health conditions 12 (28%)
Sensory Impairments 11 (26%)
Dementia 28 (65%) 
Behaviour that can challenge 1 (2%)
Funding sources
Local authorities 40 (93%)
NHS and clinical commissioning groups 24 (56%)
Self-funders 37 (86%)
Not for profit 1 (2%)
Occupancy
Median bed capacity (IQR) 29 (17–40)
Median % occupancy, Dec 19–Mar 20 (IQR) 92% (81%–97%)
Median % occupancy, current (IQR) 80% (74%–93%)
Median drop in % occupancy (IQR) 8% (6%–10%)
Closed to visitors before March 17th 18 (45%)
Resident cases and testing 
Any resident testing 30 (70%)
At least one suspected case 24 (56%)
Have tested asymptomatic residents 18 (42%)
All residents tested 4 (9%)
At least one confirmed case 16 (37%)




Have tested asymptomatic staff 22 (51%)
* Options were mutually exclusive.
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offered testing but formal acknowledgement of this policy 
awaited publication of the Adult Social Care Plan on the 
16th of April (UK Government, 2020a) and none of these 
care homes were formally followed up by outbreak teams. 
Instead, newly identified cases were reported to the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC) (the regulator for the sector), 
who usually record adverse events with implications for 
quality of care rather than public health events requiring 
investigation. Meanwhile, the Scientific Advisory Group 
for Emergencies (SAGE), which advises the government, 
had identified the potential for asymptomatic transmis-
sion as early as the 28th of January and when it had 
become clear in March that asymptomatic infection was 
likely to be common in care home residents (McMichael 
et al., 2020), they also discussed the evidence for mass 
and pooled testing on the 21st of April (Smith et al., 2020) 
In a press briefing on the 28th of April, the government 
announced whole home mass testing for all care homes 
containing older residents and those with dementia, by 
which stage, nearly 80% of all outbreaks recorded by 
mid-July had already taken place (Public Health England, 
2020e). Guidance about who care home providers should 
test and when, how to maintain safe staffing levels in the 
event of mass absenteeism, and what to do with positive 
results was not published until 19th of June (Public Health 
England, 2020b).
Testing survey results
By the end of May and early June, only 4 (10%) care homes 
in our survey had tested all of their residents, with only 
partial testing in other homes. Table 2 shows that testing 
had taken place in 30 (70%) care homes, where 105 symp-
tomatic and 307 asymptomatic residents were tested, 
accounting for 45% (31%–59%) of the 912 residents in 
these homes and 36% (95% CI 25%–48%) of all 1,311 
residents in the survey. Of those 412 tests, 69 cases were 
confirmed in 16 (37%) care homes, producing a positivity 
rate of 17% (95% CI 6%–28%). Symptomatic residents 
were identified in 24 (56%) care homes where 145 out 
of all 745 (19% (95% CI 13%–26%) residents had symp-
toms. Of these, 72% (95% CI 58%–87%)) were tested, of 
which 47 (45% (95% CI 25%–65%) were positive. Asymp-
tomatic resident testing was only reported by 18 (42%) 
care homes, where 59% (95% CI 38%–80%) of residents 
(307 out of 521) were tested (excluding symptomatic 
cases), of which 22 (7% (95% CI –2%–16%)) tested posi-
tive in 5 (28%) homes. Overall, 32% (95% CI 6%–57%) 
of all confirmed resident cases were asymptomatic at the 
time of testing, of whom 2 (9%) subsequently developed 
symptoms. Twenty-two (55%) homes had tested asympto-
matic staff, with 4% (95% CI 0.4%–9%)) testing positive 
(9 out of 215) in 5 (23%) care homes. Of those, 4 (45%) 
subsequently developed symptoms.












Any resident testing 30 (70%) 912 412 45% (31%–59%)
Confirmed Cases 16 (37%) 912 69 8% (3%–12%)
Positivity rate 17% (6%–28%)
Symptomatic residents
Symptomatic residents 24 (56%) 745 145 19% (13%–26%)
Symptomatic residents that were tested 21 (49%) 655 105 16% (10%–22%)
Confirmed symptomatic cases 15 (35%) 655 47 7% (4%–11%)
Positivity rate 45% (25%–65%)
Asymptomatic Residents (hot and cold homes)
Asymptomatic residents that were tested 18 (42%) 521 307 59% (38%–80%)
Asymptomatic confirmed cases 5 (12%) 521 22 4% (–1%–9%)
Positivity rate 7% (–2%–16%)
No. cases who later developed symptoms 22 2 9%
% of confirmed resident cases that were asymptomatic 32% (6%–57%)
Staff
Asymptomatic + tested 22 (51%) N/A 215 N/A
Asymptomatic confirmed cases 5 (12%) N/A 9 N/A
Positivity rate 4% (0.4%–9%)
No. cases who later developed symptoms 4 (45%)
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PPE and infection control policies
Infection control guidance was first published in early 
January (Public Health England, 2020d) and was updated 
30 times by mid June, sometimes daily. Guidance pub-
lished on the 25th of February (Public Health England, 
2020a) explicitly advised against use of facemasks in 
care homes, which were not advised until the 13th of 
March (Public Health England, 2020c), when they were 
only advised for symptomatic residents. At this time, the 
government issued 300 free masks from the influenza 
pandemic stockpile to every CQC registered care home 
to support them to comply with the new guidance. On 
the 10th of April a new PPE plan was published, along-
side additional guidance, now recommending use of PPE 
for contact with any residents, regardless of symptoms, 
as community transmission was now deemed to be sus-
tained. This was accompanied by an announcement that 
more PPE would be released to local resilience forums for 
distribution as needed, with additional supplies released 
to designated wholesalers for care homes to purchase. The 
plan also promised the development of a Parallel Supply 
Chain to be operated by the army, which would “push” 
PPE products to care homes according to need. This was 
not mentioned again until the 5th June (Department of 
Health and Social Care, 2020b) when it was announced 
that this would only be an emergency source of PPE.
PPE and infection control survey results
62% of managers in our survey reported that they had 
always had enough PPE, and only 5% could recall a time 
when PPE had been completely unavailable to their 
homes (Table 3). However, directors reported that this 
was only achieved because they paid inflated prices. 
63% of managers reported that Local Authority provision 
of emergency PPE had been useful, but 68% reported 
needing more support to procure PPE. A more detailed 
analysis showed how directors procured PPE from many 
sources, with 69% using government wholesalers, 29% 
relying at times on local resilience forums for emergency 
supplies, and 34% sourcing PPE from abroad (Rajan and 
Mckee, 2020). 79% had struggled to source facemasks, 
and around half encountered challenges procuring 
Table 3: Care Home Managers’ Experiences of the Policies for PPE and Isolation and Workforce Challenges.
Managers
Concerns providing PPE* (N = 43)
Always had enough 27 (63%)
Yes <7 days’ supply at times 14 (33%)
Yes <24 hrs supply at times 0 (0%)
Yes – completely unavailable at times 2 (5%)
Isolation of residents with suspected COVID-19 (N = 40)
Not able to 10 (25%)
Able to but didn’t 3 (8%)
Able to and did but not always possible 14 (35%)
Able to and always did 13 (33%)
Challenges implementing PHE infection control guidance (N = 43)
Understanding and applying guidance 10 (23%)
Conflicting guidance from different organisations 29 (67%)
Keeping up with frequent changes to guidance 32 (74%)
Insufficient testing for atypical presentations 18 (42%)
Inability to isolate residents who walk with purpose 20 (47%)
Managing admissions from hospitals 10 (23%)
Managing visitors 6 (14%) 
Greatest workforce challenges (N = 41)
At least one staff member isolated with symptoms 31 (70%)
Morale, mental health and wellbeing 30 (73%)
Staffing Shortages 16 (39%)
Access to and interpretation of COVID-19 tests 22 (54%)
Staff training 6 (15%)
(Contd.)
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gloves, aprons and hand sanitizer (Rajan and Mckee, 
2020). 74% of managers also reported that frequent 
changes in infection control guidance were particularly 
challenging, with 67% of managers reporting inconsist-
encies in government guidance, and conflicts with many 
local health and social care departments who often issued 
their own policies.
Isolation and visitation policies
Isolation precautions were initially based on usual prac-
tice for influenza (Public Health England, 2020c). Staff 
would notify Public Health England Health Protection 
Teams about any cases with symptoms, and they would 
advise that resident and their contacts to isolate, although 
this was not clearly documented in guidance until the 2nd 
of April (Public Health England, 2020b). The Adult Social 
Care plan was published on the 16th of April (UK Govern-
ment, 2020a), acknowledging that there may be some dif-
ficulties in isolating residents, stating that: “If appropriate 
isolation/cohorted care is not available with a local care 
provider, the individual’s local authority will be asked to 
secure alternative and appropriate accommodation and 
care for the remainder of the required isolation period” 
(section 1.32). It was suggested at the time that this be 
achieved in association with the NHS.
Prior to this, NHS guidance published on the 19th of 
March (UK Government, 2020b) called on hospitals to dis-
charge residents to care homes to free up capacity, and 
care homes were reassured that it was safe to receive these 
patients without testing. It was not until the 2nd of April 
that mandatory isolation of admissions was introduced 
(Public Health England, 2020b).
In the early stages, visitation to care homes was only 
prohibited for people with symptoms of COVID-19 
(Public Health England, 2020c) until the 16th of March, 
when physical distancing was announced, after which, 
all visits were prohibited and the Prime Minister warned 
against anyone visiting care homes unnecessarily (BBC 
News, 2020). On the 15th of April, the Secretary of 
State announced that families could now visit dying 
relatives in care homes where feasible, and this was sub-
sequently confirmed in the Adult Social Care Plan (UK 
Government, 2020a).
Isolation and visitation survey results
60% of managers in our survey said that they had not 
always been able to isolate residents with suspected 
COVID-19, with 45% being unable to isolate residents 
who walked with purpose. 26% were unable to cohort 
residents, often because the home layout precluded the 
creation of separate units (Table 3). In reality, many 
care homes we surveyed had closed down by the 5th of 
February (irrespective of symptoms), and by the 30th of 
March all had closed to visitors (Figure 2). By the time 
physical distancing was announced in mid-March, 54% 
of homes in this survey had already closed to non-essen-
tial visits. This isolation had enormous impacts on resi-
dents according to care home managers: 84% reported 
low mood among residents, attributed predominantly 
to being deprived of visitors (98%) and fewer activi-
ties (54%), while 46% also commented on the impact 
of PPE on relationships with staff, while 28% reported 
reduced oral intake, and several described weight loss 
(Table 3).
Managers
Provision of occupational health services 3 (7%)
Providing accommodation for staff 2 (5%)
Other 10 (26%)
Have you observed any of the following in residents following isolation for COVID-19? (N = 33)
Low mood and agitation 28 (85%)
Pressure sores 1 (3%)
Increased falls 2 (6%)
Reduced mobility 4 (12%)
Reduced oral intake/weight loss 10 (30%)
None 4 (12%)
What factors have influenced resident wellbeing during the COVID-19 pandemic? (N = 42)
Reduced access to clinical support for residents 15 (36%)
Fewer activities 22 (52%)
Fewer social interactions from visitors and other residents 41 (98%)
Disrupted routines e.g. mealtimes 6 (14%)
Impacts of PPE on relationships with care staff 20 (48%)
Other 2 (5%)
* Options were mutually exclusive.
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Staffing policies
On the 13th of March, as a temporary measure, the gov-
ernment committed to paying for Statutory Sick Pay 
from day one of sickness to support those affected by 
COVID-19 (Public Health England, 2020c). As part of the 
Adult Social Care Plan in April they also announced an 
intention to launch a new social care recruitment cam-
paign (UK Government, 2020a), subsequently offering 
Psychological First Aid training to frontline workers later 
on in June. The Adult Social Care Plan also committed to 
publishing more detailed guidance on the use of volun-
teers in care homes, but this has yet to materialise at the 
time of writing. Following a Public Health England whole 
home testing study in several care homes in London in 
April, which suggested that transmission had occurred 
between care homes, mediated by the increased use of 
bank staff, (Whately, 2020) it was proposed that the infec-
tion control fund should be used to pay the salaries of 
additional staff; to maintain the normal wages of staff 
who are self-isolating; and provide staff with accommoda-
tion and infection control training (Department of Health 
and Social Care, 2020a).
Staffing survey results
At least one staff member had isolated with symptoms 
of COVID-19 in 72% of care homes in our survey, includ-
ing all of the homes with reported outbreaks. Staff were 
hospitalised in 3 (10%) facilities, with 1 (3%) reporting a 
death. As shown in Table 3, 43% of managers we surveyed 
reported staffing shortages and 1 in 3 described resorting 
to using agency staff, who accounted for between 2 and 
37% of their workforce. Nearly half of directors in the sur-
vey also stated that they still needed support with surge 
staffing and described their frustrations with being una-
ble to routinely test staff. 75% of managers also reported 
that they were concerned for the morale, mental health 
and wellbeing of their staff and 37% commented that the 




COVID-19 has disproportionately impacted mortality in 
care homes internationally and in that respect, England is 
no particular exception, with care home resident deaths 
accounting for approximately 46% of all COVID-19 mor-
tality (Comas-Herrera, Zalakaín, et al., 2020). A brief look 
at the WHO policy recommendations (World Health 
Organization, 2020) suggests that on paper, the govern-
ment has heeded advice to test, ensure access to PPE, 
limit visiting, isolate new admissions, bring in additional 
staff, avoid staff working across multiple facilities, pro-
vide infection control guidance and provide additional 
funds. However, in practice we found questions as to 
how promptly and effectively these had been written 
into guidance and/or implemented. Also, many of these 
decisions were arguably made very late by the govern-
ment and some resources remained unavailable or hard 
to source to many providers in our survey. In addition, 
homes had difficulties with frequently changing, some-
times conflicting and often impractical guidance.
COVID-19 has magnified existing weaknesses in the 
English adult social care system’s support to care homes 
and, while the UK government announced a number of 
policies to mitigate the impacts of COVID-19 on English 
care home staff and residents, most were not announced 
until after the majority of outbreaks had already taken 
place and were inconsistently implemented. Delays 
to scaling up testing and the prioritisation of the NHS 
over social care have attracted much criticism, most 
recently by the Commons Health Select Committee (UK 
Government, 2020c) and the Public Accounts Committee 
(Public Accounts Committee, 2020). Despite the welcome 
announcements that the Department of Health and Social 
Care would provide whole home testing to care homes 
across the country, this was not fully implemented until 
June and only 40% of care homes represented in our sur-
vey had accessed any testing for asymptomatic residents 
by the end of May and early June when the peak had 
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passed and reopening had already begun. Despite this, we 
found that nearly one in six residents who were swabbed 
tested positive for COVID-19 at the time of testing, and 
a third were infected without displaying symptoms, rein-
forcing the need for ongoing surveillance. Some ministers 
have justified late policy decisions as a response to early 
uncertainties about asymptomatic transmission, although 
evidence to support concern about this was published as 
early as January 2020 (Arons et al., 2020; Rothe et al., 
2020). In July, the government announced that all staff 
and residents in care homes for over 65s or those with 
dementia would be regularly tested for COVID-19, but 
confirmed several weeks later that this would no longer 
be feasible before September. Instead, they committed 
in early August to providing rapid point of care testing 
within a week, using tests that were to be validated during 
role out, but this had yet to materialise by September (UK 
Government, 2020d). Blanket swab testing is particularly 
time-consuming for care homes and there is still minimal 
evidence about the degree to which asymptomatic cases 
contribute to transmission. The situation in care homes in 
September remains tenuous, with many starting to open 
up to visitors, on the government’s advice, without reli-
able access to repeated testing. Elsewhere we report data 
from our survey showing that trust by care home man-
agers and directors in the government has deteriorated 
(Rajan and Mckee, 2020).
There has been a great deal of media attention on the 
poor access that social care providers had to a robust PPE 
supply chain, and it is also not known whether the delay in 
advising the routine use of PPE in care homes to account 
for asymptomatic transmission placed residents and social 
care workers at increased risk of mortality. Inevitably, the 
frequent and unannounced changes to guidance left 
providers in a challenging position, competing with one 
another for PPE supplies at rapidly increasing costs. While 
it is unsurprising that demand would outstrip supply in 
a pandemic situation, evidence highlights a failure of 
government to replenish influenza stockpiles (Dunn et 
al., 2020) and as yet, there is no evidence that the supply 
chain of PPE to care homes will cope if there is a sudden 
resurgence of cases in winter.
Unsurprisingly, workforce shortages were an immense 
challenge, with many care home managers using agency 
staff to cover absences, and there was widespread con-
cern about staff mental health and wellbeing. Although 
political rhetoric emphasised recruiting more NHS staff 
during the pandemic, England entered the pandemic with 
122,000 vacancies in social care (Skills for Care, 2019), 
which are unlikely to be meaningfully addressed by a 
campaign to recruit 20,000 people. While the publication 
of the NHS People’s Plan is welcome, there is now a very 
urgent need to provide a clear plan for workforce recruit-
ment, welfare, and development in adult social care.
The lack of clear guidance on visitors confused care 
home managers, many of whom closed to visitors long 
before the government imposed physical distancing. 
Although guidance around the safe reopening of care 
homes to visitors was not published until the 22nd of 
July (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020c), 
many providers did not wait, turning instead to the Care 
Providers Alliance (an umbrella organisation for adult 
social care providers) who supported them to reopen 
safely and cope with the inevitable psychological impacts 
on residents.
During the pandemic, residents experienced reduced 
access to healthcare, with falls in elective and emergency 
admissions to hospitals from care homes and a rise in 
admissions from hospitals to nursing homes (Hodgson et 
al., 2020). However there were some positive examples of 
work to improve health care for residents in the full sur-
vey report, such as the creation of local multi-disciplinary 
teams with health and social care working in partnership 
to find local solutions (Rajan and Mckee, 2020).
Isolating residents with suspected COVID-19 within the 
home was enormously challenging given home layouts 
and the large share of residents who walk with purpose 
and more than half of managers confirmed that they could 
not always isolate and cohort residents, where necessary. 
Prior to April 2nd, residents who were admitted to care 
homes from hospitals were not required to isolate, and it 
is plausible that this may have resulted in some increased 
transmission. Even after this advice was published, care 
home managers faced logistic, physical, and emotional 
challenges in isolating residents. Despite the recommen-
dation for local authorities to provide quarantine facili-
ties, it is not clear that this happened or that there is yet 
sufficient resource to implement this. In Singapore, where 
only 3 deaths have been recorded in care home residents 
so far, special quarantine facilities were provided to isolate 
suspected cases in long-term care facilities.
A formal inquiry may be required to discern the rea-
sons for the delayed and poorly implemented govern-
ment policies but it is likely that they were the product 
of both structural and socio-political factors (Daly, 2020). 
From the structural point of view, the social care sector 
is consistently excluded from health policies and ser-
vices, which are rarely co-designed with either the sec-
tor or the residents who use them. The sector itself is 
diverse, and two-thirds are either small or not-for profit 
providers, without consistent support or representation 
(Devi et al., 2020). Following years of government under-
funding and lack of public commitment to social care, 
some have suggested that policies for care homes may 
have been considered less politically important than 
those for the NHS (Daly, 2020). It is now expected that 
imminent reforms to funding, safety, and regulation of 
social care as well as its relationship with the NHS will 
be expedited, with the guidance of an Adult Social Care 
Taskforce. The content of these reforms is still unknown 
as is the extent to which they will be based on rigor-
ous consultation with residents, relatives, providers and 
commissioners.
Strengths and Limitations
There is no other study we are aware of that has docu-
mented how government policies affected care home pro-
viders’ ability to respond to the pandemic, but there are 
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several limitations to this research. This was not a repre-
sentative sample of care homes from England and many 
homes did not respond amidst the emergency response. 
The survey may have attracted more response from care 
homes who struggled with the issues discussed above 
than from those who found it easier to adapt although 
those with outbreaks may also have had less capacity to 
respond. We have therefore extracted the most consistent 
themes that were reported by providers, rather than per-
forming detailed quantitative analyses. Some aspects of 
policy will have also changed since early June.
Conclusion
The government’s policies and measures to protect people 
living in care homes and support providers did not suc-
ceed in providing a “protective ring around care homes.” 
Its policies were good on paper but were often too late 
and were neither communicated nor implemented ade-
quately. Those running care homes in our survey felt 
unsupported in the first wave, especially with respect to 
accessing funds, testing, PPE, workforce support and prac-
tical support (such as additional quarantine facilities out-
side the homes where needed). This paper also highlights 
the danger of relying only on policy announcements to 
assess the degree to which countries have worked on 
mitigating COVID in care homes.
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